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China to stay a plodding “ox” in year of the tiger

year of the tiger 2010

After blasting to recovery from the global financial crisis, China will enter next year wrestling with unwelcome expectations for it to shoulder a bigger role in insulating the world economy against more turmoil.

China is set to overtake Japan as the world’s second-biggest economy in 2010, and calls are likely to grow for it to cash in more of its accumulated wealth and influence to address trade imbalances, currency friction and diplomatic disputes.

Yet while some see China as a super-power confidently limbering up for a sprint to the lead, its leaders see it as facing domestic and external risks that demand cautious plodding.

In the traditional Chinese calendar, next year is the year of the tiger. But expect Beijing to keep behaving in economic diplomacy like this year’s talismanic animal, the ox: steady, sometimes frustratingly so for some, and resistant to prodding.

“We don’t want to be treated as a superpower or global leader, but on specific issues, such as international financial reform, China will choose to be more active next year and beyond,” said Chu Shulong, an international relations professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing, who recently led a study of Beijing’s global policy options.

“This ambivalence in Chinese foreign policy will continue for a long time.”

In trade, especially, China is likely to be increasingly on the defensive next year, with its stable exchange rate policy arousing rancor and, potentially, retaliatory tariffs.

China’s trade surplus, which shrank by 30 percent over the past year as global demand shriveled, could ignite diplomatic tensions if it rebounds with faster U.S. and European growth.

“That’s going to fuel real trade tensions, if the trade surplus goes up again,” said Michael Pettis, a senior associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based in Beijing.

“I don’t see much chance that we’ll be able to avoid that.”

Trade disputes from steel to shoes have already piled up in just the past three months. The pipeline of U.S. complaints alleging unfair Chinese trade practices points to a bigger docket of cases next year, something Beijing fears.

“Trade protectionism will again rear its head, leading to frequent disputes and friction between China and many trade partners,” Liu Youfa, vice-head of the China Institute of International Studies, a think-tank under the Foreign Ministry, wrote this week in Outlook Weekly, a Chinese magazine.

PRIDE AND CONTENTION

China’s worries sit awkwardly with heady pride about its rising stature.

If its recovery stays strong, China “will remain the locomotive of world economic growth,” a commentary in the overseas edition of the official People’s Daily said on Friday.

But critics contend that China’s strength has come at the expense of others. Its share of the overall global trade surplus has nearly doubled this year, even if its own surplus has shrunk — giving ammunition to those who say that its export-friendly policies have robbed other countries of jobs.

When U.S. President Barack Obama visited Beijing in November, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao tried to reassure him that China was not seeking a trade surplus.

Such words will find few takers in Washington while China keeps the yuan more or less frozen in place against the dollar, as it has done since global financial turmoil deepened in mid-2008.

Beijing risks growing friction with Washington, where prominent senators have asked for an investigation into whether the yuan policy is a form of subsidy that would justify tariffs on Chinese imports.

If China moves on the yuan in 2010, however, it will be for domestic reasons, and Beijing’s main concern will remain protecting jobs by cushioning its battered exporters.

The ruling Communist Party sees stoking employment and income growth as crucial to maintaining control, and market expectations are of only 1.9 percent appreciation in the next 12 months.

“For that reason, we continue to think authorities will move quite slowly on appreciation,” Fitch Ratings analyst James McCormack said. “It’s going to be an on-going issue for policymakers here right through the medium term.”

Those same cautious instincts, however, mean Chinese policy-makers are unlikely to launch fresh rhetorical assaults on the U.S. dollar and Washington’s financial failings that may win public applause but threaten to undermine Beijing’s own vast foreign exchange assets.

Earlier this year, China’s central bank floated broad ideas to eventually shift from reliance on the dollar as the primary global reserve currency.

Since then, however, policy-makers have gone quiet about those ideas and signaled that the dollar will remain their mainstay for a long time to come.

“China favors international financial system reform, but those reforms revolve around the U.S. dollar and so China wants only gradual changes,” said Chu, the Beijing professor.

“We eventually want to reduce the role of the U.S. dollar, but not so fast that we damage our own assets.”

Warren Buffett: “We Didn’t Do Anything Really Dumb”

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Looking back at his performance during the global financial crisis of the past two years, Warren Buffett tells the Wall Street Journal, “We didn’t do all the smartest things. We didn’t do anything really dumb.”

Buffett admits that he could have done better if he waited until the stock market bottomed in March of this year, but he’s happy with the Goldman Sachs [GS 166.00 --- UNCH (0) ] and General Electric deals [GE 15.92 --- UNCH (0) ] he agreed to in September and October of 2008.

“I made plenty of mistakes. I didn’t maximize the opportunities offered by the chaos. But in the end, it worked out OK.”

That’s because he avoided making a number of deals offered to him that could have proven disasterous. Plus, rejecting all those offers left him with the ammunition to make his biggest deal ever, last month’s announced $26 billion acquisition of railroad operator Burlington Northern Santa Fe [BNI 98.58 --- UNCH (0) ].

Buffett’s “epic deal negotiations, including anxious phone calls he fielded from wounded companies such as Freddie Mac [FRE 1.26 --- UNCH (0) ], Wachovia, and Morgan Stanley [MS 29.78 --- UNCH (0) ].”

Buffett also turned down potential deals with Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and AIG [AIG 28.37 --- UNCH (0) ].

As Janney Montgomery Scott analyst Paul Howard tells Patterson, “I don’t think Buffett gets enough credit for all the pitches he doesn’t swing at. And he gets a lot of pitches.”

Current Berkshire stock prices:

Class A: [BRK.A 99000.00 --- UNCH (0) ]

Class B: [BRK.B 3287.00 --- UNCH (0) ]

U.S. regulators unlikely to break up biggest banks

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U.S. lawmakers are looking at ways to limit the damage that large banks, insurers and funds can wreak on the financial system, but breaking up healthy companies is unlikely to be part of the mix because it is too difficult to implement.

The Federal Reserve already has the authority to force banks to shed businesses that pose a risk to the banking system, but that power is rarely, if ever, used.

The issue of breaking up banks deemed “too big to fail” has been discussed for months as lawmakers and regulators look to reduce the chances of a meltdown like the recent financial crisis, which cost taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars and hobbled major financial institutions.

It flared up again when U.S. Representative Paul Kanjorski added an amendment to proposed financial reform legislation allowing regulators to break up healthy companies that posed a risk to the financial system.

On Wednesday, the House’s lead financial rule-writing panel voted to approve the amendment, and it may well pass the full House of Representatives. But it is seen as less likely to make it through the Senate. And even if it does, regulators are unlikely to use their new power, analysts say.

Although experts may continue to discuss the idea of breaking up large, healthy institutions, many argue it deserves to die because of the myriad logistical obstacles.

“Capping the size of financial institutions is just the wrong thing to do,” said Dan Alpert, managing director at boutique investment bank Westwood Capital.

One problem is determining which institutions are too big to fail. If a major bank were split up, the individual businesses might still be too big to fail, and those units would in turn have to be divided. Determining how to best divide them is difficult.

Meanwhile, a number of businesses that did not seem systemically important five years ago were in fact critical during the credit crunch. A good example is the bond insurers, which were seen for years as small companies interesting mainly to short-sellers. That changed in early 2008, when bond insurers’ difficulties suddenly seemed important to the entire financial system.

“The whole idea of a top 20 list of financial institutions that are systemically important does not make sense, because No. 21 might have problems, and that might create problems for Nos. 1 and 2. It’s not always clear who is too big to fail,” said Christopher Laursen, a senior consultant at NERA Economic Consulting who previously worked at the Federal Reserve.

CAPITALIZING THE PARTS

Another possible problem in breaking up healthy financial institutions is capitalizing the parts. A company’s individual businesses may need more capital if they are separate than if they are together, said Tanya Azarchs, a bank ratings analyst at Standard & Poor’s.

“The market is more tolerant of lower capital levels for a company if there is more diversification,” Azarchs said.

Diversification makes a financial company’s earnings more stable — when one business is weak, another may be flourishing. Regulators don’t give financial companies credit for diversification, but investors and to a lesser extent rating agencies do.

So regulators breaking up a company may also have to figure out how the resulting businesses will raise capital. Convincing investors to provide more equity may be difficult.

“You’re breaking up a company because you’re concerned it will hurt the financial system, even though to everyone else it seems healthy. Is that a good story to tell investors?” said one hedge fund manager.

Breaking up healthy companies may not make sense, but few analysts dispute that the government needs a way to break up large financial firms on the brink of collapse.

The regular bankruptcy process is not ideal for winding down a major bank in a way that minimizes the impact on the financial system, as evident from the demise of Lehman Brothers Holdings in September 2008.

And some experts believe breaking up even healthy banks may be a good idea.

Large banks can help companies and governments globally raise capital, but the financial crisis revealed the enormous cost of that benefit, said Steve Kohlhagen, who built the derivatives business at First Union and later Wachovia.

Even if the United States is the only country to break up its banks, and foreign banks start winning more global business, over time smaller institutions will prove to have an advantage, Kohlhagen said.

“There’s a cost, but in the long run I think breaking up institutions is the only way to do it,” he said. Breaking up large institutions makes sense if Americans are generally uncomfortable with taking over large failed institutions from time to time, he added.

But to many analysts, the seemingly simple fix of breaking up big healthy institutions is anything but simple.

“Breaking up these institutions is not an easy thing to do, and if it’s not done right, it could create an unlevel playing field based on potentially arbitrary criteria,” said Karen Shaw Petrou, managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics, a research and consulting firm focusing on political and regulatory risk.

Government Backed $4.3 Trillion in Assets Last Year

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The U.S. government guaranteed as much as $4.3 trillion in financial assets last year, making such backstops the biggest and riskiest part of Washington’s response to the financial crisis, a bailout watchdog panel said on Friday.

The Congressional Oversight Panel said in its latest monthly report that the asset guarantees from the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp helped calm panic in financial markets at minimal cost to taxpayers so far.

To date, the programs have generated fees of about $17.4 billion, while only up to $2 million is expected to be paid out for a default under the FDIC’s bank debt guarantee program.

The report said for program that once guaranteed a pool of $301 billion in Citigroup assets, initial actuarial estimates point towards a possible loss of $34.6 billion under a “moderate” stress scenario.

But since Citigroup must absorb the first $39.5 billion in losses from these assets, taxpayers would not be liable for any of this. A “severe” stress test scenario would result in losses of $43.9 billion, of which taxpayers would have to absorb nearly $4 billion.

The panel, charged with overseeing the U.S. Treasury’s $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program, said that as financial markets stabilize and the scope of the guarantee programs decrease, the likelihood of major expenditures also diminishes.

“This apparently positive outcome, however, was achieved at the price of a significant amount of risk,” the panel said in the report. “A significant element of moral hazard has been injected into the financial system and a very large amount of money remains at risk.”

Elizabeth Warren, the Harvard Law School professor who heads the Congressional Oversight panel, said the guarantees also produced significant distortions in private markets, drawing funds to assets that had backstops.

“The fact that there is no upfront cost is both the beauty and danger of guarantees,” she told a conference call on the report. “They are perhaps too tempting.”

The majority of the $4.3 trillion that the government guaranteed came from a money market mutual fund guarantee program aimed at preventing massive withdrawals of such funds in the fall of 2008. At its height, the program guaranteed $3.217 trillion in money market fund assets.

Among other programs reviewed in the report, the FDIC debt guarantee program currently backstops about $307 billion in outstanding obligations.

The watchdog panel said it did not identify any significant flaws in the Treasury’s implementation of its programs and noted that Treasury has taken a more aggressive stance in safeguarding taxpayer funds.

But it recommended that the Treasury disclose more information on the rationale and justifications for creating the money market guarantee program, and explanations of why Citigroup and Bank of America were the only institutions selected for asset guarantee protection.

It also asked for more updates on the pool of Citigroup assets, now estimated at $266.4 billion, including total and projected losses.

Toxic Assets Explained

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“Toxic asset” is a non-technical term for certain financial assets whose value has fallen significantly and for which there is no longer a functioning market, so that they cannot be reasonably sold. The term became common during the financial crisis of 2007–2009, in which they played a major role.

When the market for such assets ceases to function, it is described as “frozen”. Markets for some toxic assets froze in 2007, and the problem grew significantly worse in the second half of 2008. Several factors contributed to the freezing of toxic asset markets. The value of the assets were very sensitive to economic conditions, and increased uncertainty in these conditions made it difficult to estimate the value of the assets. Banks and other major financial-institutions were unwilling to sell the assets at significantly reduced prices, since lower prices would force them to reduce significantly their stated assets, making them appear insolvent.

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